Treasury Sanctions Houthi Financial Facilitators and Five Cryptocurrency Addresses

Today, the United States Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) targeted the financial networks sustaining the Houthi movement in Yemen, designating 12 individuals and entities across multiple jurisdictions. The action focuses on a web of arms traffickers, financial operatives, shipping facilitators, and smuggling networks that enable the Houthis to fund and sustain their destabilizing regional activities.

Among those sanctioned are prominent figures such as Hashem Ismail Ali Ahmad al-Madani, the governor of the Houthi-aligned Central Bank of Yemen in Sana’a, and Ahmed Muhammad Muhammad Hasan al-Hadi, a senior Houthi financial official. Al-Madani has been identified as a key intermediary in the transfer of funds from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) to the Houthis, facilitating transactions to support their military and operational objectives. Al-Hadi, meanwhile, has coordinated the movement and disbursement of these funds within Yemen, ordering other Houthi financial officials, including U.S.-designated operative Sa’id al-Jamal, to allocate resources to Houthi leaders and operatives.

The Houthi financial apparatus relies heavily on money service businesses under their control to circumvent international sanctions and funnel large sums of money to their operations. Al-Jamal’s network, for instance, has leveraged entities such as Mohammed Ali Al Thawr Exchange and Al Hazmi Exchange to channel millions of dollars into Yemen. These funds have been used to support money-laundering activities involving the IRGC-QF and to cover the sanctioned assets of al-Jamal-controlled entities like the Davos Exchange and Remittances Company. These exchanges, operating under the guise of legitimate financial institutions, have played a pivotal role in laundering illicit proceeds and maintaining the Houthis’ financial stability.

Five cryptocurrency wallets linked to the network have been identified and added to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), highlighting the evolving tactics employed by the Houthis and their affiliates to exploit digital currencies. 

According to TRM Labs, collectively, these designated addresses received over USD 330 million in total inflows. Additionally, TRM noted these addresses used a wide variety of services, both centralized and decentralized, in order to facilitate some of their transactional activity.

The Houthis’ procurement and logistics operations are also sophisticated, involving key operatives and firms based in Yemen and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Wail Muhammad Said Abd-al-Wadud and Umar Ahmad Umar Ahmad Hajj, both logistics officials, have facilitated smuggling operations that transport weapons and dual-use components into Yemen. These materials are critical for the Houthis’ military campaigns, which include the deployment of drones, missiles, and other advanced weaponry. Yemen-based Safwan Al-Dubai Company of Shipping and Trade, a shipping firm with a presence in the PRC, has been instrumental in transporting these items. The company’s operations obscure the origins of weapons shipments, making it harder for international regulators to identify and intercept illicit cargo.

The Houthis’ financial and logistical networks extend to the illicit sale of Iranian oil, which generates substantial revenue for their operations. Sa’id al-Jamal has been identified as a central figure in this scheme, overseeing the transportation of Iranian petroleum to customers in East Asia. His network relies on Malaysian shipping firms such as Blu Shipping (M) SDN BHD and Tefcas Marine SDN BHD, which have provided critical services to vessels transporting Iranian commodities. One such vessel, the RENEEZ, has carried tens of thousands of metric tons of Iranian oil under the supervision of these companies. Similarly, Merkur Energy Port Services SDN BHD, owned by Puvaneswaran Venayagamoorthy and managed by Ezekial Kanniappan Jr., acted as the port agent for another U.S.-designated vessel, the YORGOS, facilitating the movement of Iranian oil for the benefit of the Houthis.

These financial and logistical networks directly support the Houthis’ destabilizing activities in Yemen and beyond. The Houthis have continued to wage a brutal campaign involving missile strikes, drone attacks, and regional destabilization efforts, often targeting civilian infrastructure and exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. 

Just this week, the United States conducted an airstrike on a Houthi command-and-control facility in Yemen, following heightened Houthi attacks on international shipping vessels in the Red Sea. The Houthis’ ties to Iran, particularly the IRGC-QF, highlight their role as a proxy force in Tehran’s regional agenda, further complicating efforts to stabilize the region.

By targeting key individuals, financial facilitators, and logistical operatives, OFAC aims to sever the financial lifelines that sustain the Houthis’ military and political ambitions. The designation of cryptocurrency wallets, money service businesses, and international shipping firms underscores the global reach of these networks and the importance of international collaboration in combating them. The involvement of Malaysia-based entities in facilitating the illicit oil trade further demonstrates the need for vigilance in regulating global shipping and financial systems.